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My reaction to Professor Schwed’s paper is greatly colored by a book I
have written but which has not been published My book, Non-Contradiction
has two volumes. In the first volume I retell the story of Greek Philosophy from
Heraclitus through Aristotle. I do not go on into the Megarian-Stoic-academic
period. I argue that the main issue in the period I look at is the truth of the law
of Non-contradiction. Heraclitus denied it. Parmenides affirmed it but got it
into all kinds of trouble. And Plato and Aristotle defended it. The fact that they
defended it so strenuously means that they accepted it as being a real issue
and did not think, as we tend to today, that it is just a foregone and
unquestioned proposition.
Plato tried to save Non-contradiction by surrendering the ordinary
empirical world as unreal and moving to another world, the world of Forms. But
the contradictions that Plato saw in the empirical world followed Plato, in the
later part of the Parmenides, into the world of Forms and even into the world of
Parmenides’ One. It was therefore left to Aristotle to defend Non-contradiction
in the way that would satisfy most of later Western thought, by arguing that the
empirical world itself was consistent.
In my book, I take this to basically settle the issue of Non-contradiction,
as far as most later Western thought was concerned, and this despite some
left-over problems, such as Zeno’s paradoxes and the Liar, which Aristotle left
not really solved. In volume II, therefore, I skip ahead to Hegel, where the law
becomes again dialectically unstuck. However, I did not look at the Greek
period after Aristotle.
In his paper, Schwed looks at this period. I find what he says very
agreeable. He is saying that Non-contradiction and related themes remain a
live issue. The Liar is a live argument on a live issue. The debate continues
as in the previous period. This all strikes me as very likely true. Now I turn to a
terminological point.
The Aristotelean truth theory contains three propositions;. Noncontradiction, excluded middle, and the correspondence theory of truth. I shall
call this the Aristotelean theory and refer to its opponents as antiAristoteleans. Schwed calls this theory the realist theory of truth and refers to
its opponents as skeptics and anti-realists. But I find this terminology
unhappy. It may be that some anti-Aristoteleans are accurately referred to as
skeptics or anti-realists. Perhaps those in the period Schwed is discussing
are. But one’s position on Aristotle’s truth theory is not in general happily
described in these terms.

On my interpretation, Heraclitus accepts the ordinary empirical world as
fully real. He thinks he has knowledge of this world. He thinks he knows for
instance that it is full of contradictions. He therefore rejects Non-contradiction.
Now it doesn’t matter here whether this is really the historical Heraclitus’
position. It is a possible position. It is very anti-Aristotelean. But it isn’t
skeptical or anti-realist. It seems to be instead a very incautious realism.
Next comes Parmenides. On my interpretation, Parmenides affirms
Non-contradiction. Being cannot not be. (Fr. 2) And he affirms excluded
middle. Being must either be or not be. (Fr. 8) And there are at least hints of
the correspondence theory. I will not allow you to say or think or imagine what
is not. (Fr. 6) No doubt he affirms these principles in a somewhat mangled
form, but he clearly affirms them. From this, he deduces that the ordinary
world around us is unreal and unknowable. Only the One is real and we can
only know that it is. It certainly seems strange to describe Parmenides as
more realist and less skeptical than Heraclitus.
Next comes Plato. He is defending Non-contradiction. But he too, on
my interpretation, rejects the ordinary world as not really real, as a bunch of
Berkelean appearances and full of Heraclitian contradictions. Of course, he is
realist and nonskeptical about the Forms. It is only when we get to Aristotle
himself that realism, non-skepticism and Non-contradiction get into sync.
Therefore, I shall speak of the Aristotelean and anti-Aristotelean positions,
rather than of realists and skeptics.
Now I turn to a more interesting point. Granted that the liar argument is
an anti-Aristotelean argument, is it really, as Schwed says, a reductio ad
absurdum? I think that there is a lot of room for speculation here as to how
exactly the liar argument was deployed.
To dramatize the possibilities, I shall take the role of the antiAristotelean and suppose that you are my intended target audience, the wouldbe Aristoteleans. I might proceed as follows:
I accept and expect you to accept Excluded Middle. I derive that the liar
statement is either true or not true and I expect you to accept this also. I accept
and expect you to accept the correspondence theory of truth. I derive that the
liar is either true and so not true and so both true and not true, or it is not true
and so true and so again both true and not true. So I accept and expect to
force you to accept that the liar is both true and not true, contrary to Noncontradiction.
In this reconstruction, the argument is not a reductio. I am not trying to
get you to reject the premises to avoid the concluding contradiction. I am trying
to get you to accept the contradiction. I am giving a direct proof of a
contradiction, not a reductio argument. In my second reconstruction, there is
an actual reductio.

Here I look at Schwed’s own reconstruction. As he presents it there is a
main argument and a backup argument. But to me the main argument is
pointless and all the real work is done by the backup argument. The main
argument says that if realism is true, the liar statement has a truth value. But
the liar statement doesn’t have a truth value, according to the backup
argument. Therefore realism is false.
But this argument seems rather pointless. The Aristotelian theory
contains three propositions: excluded middle, Non-contradiction, and the
correspondence theory of truth. It is excluded middle in particular that seems
to imply that the liar statement has a truth value. If the liar statement doesn’t
have a truth value, why conclude that realism in general is false, why not
specifically excluded middle? Anyway the back up argument is a reductio.
Can one deploy a reductio without Non-contradiction? And if the backup is
really to prove that the liar doesn’t have a truth value, it also needs to assume
the correspondence theory. So the backup accepts two parts of Aristotle’s
theory in order to reject the third. I therefore present the backup as the whole
argument and as a reductio of excluded middle.
I assume for reductio purposes the law of excluded middle and
therefore that the liar statement is either true or not true or has a truth value. I
myself reject these assumptions and hope to force you to reject them too. I
now accept and expect you to accept the correspondence theory. I derive the
contradiction. I reject this contradiction and expect you to also reject it.
Therefore, I expect you to reject excluded middle and the idea that the liar has
a truth value or is either true or not true.
Now this is a real full-fledged reductio. But notice that I cannot regard
my own argument as decisive unless I accept two parts of Aristotle’s theory in
order to refute the third. Now I suspect Schwed will find both my first two
reconstructions to be historically implausible and I am inclined to think so as
well. In these reconstructions, the anti-Aristotelian accepts two of Aristotle’s
three points and rejects only the third. One suspects that the actual antiAristoteleans had some difficulty with all three parts of Aristotle’s view.
Of course, if I don’t accept Non-contradiction and reject contradictions, I
can’t really accept a reductio argument as decisive. I couldn’t really offer such
an argument as one I believe in, I could only offer it in an ad hominen manner,
as an argument that I expect you to accept. I shall consider an ad hominem
reconstruction a bit later.
For my third reconstruction, I want to consider, a particularly radical antiAristotelean who, paradoxically accepts all three parts of Aristotle’s theory - in
a way. This radical character is described by Aristotle himself. Aristotle says
that anyone who accepts a contradiction equates being and nonbeing and
therefore must accept all contradictions and accept p and accept not- p, for
every p. Aristotle says (1008b10ff) that this character is no better than a
vegetable as far as discourse is concerned. In my third reconstruction, I want

to play the role of this vegetable character. This will require some
preliminaries to set things up.
Aristotle says that no one can really hold the vegetable position in real
life. If one is going to negotiate through a practical situation, you need to make
discriminating judgments. I agree with this. So to make the vegetable
character a possible debater, I shall suppose he accepts all propositions and
their negations in his official philosophical position, but on a more practical
level he is able to discern the facts of his dialectical situation and is to deploy
arguments in an effective manner.
Aristotle also argues that it is not really possible to believe a
contradiction. Here I shall assume a view from an earlier paper of mine. It is
possible to accept p and simultaneously to accept not-p. But you must either
accept a proposition or reject it or remain neutral. You cannot simultaneously
accept and reject the same proposition. So if you accept p and also accept
not-p, then you are in violation of the constitutive rules for negation. These
rules say you are supposed to accept not p just in case you reject p, and to
reject not-p just in case you accept p, otherwise to be neutral about both. So if
you accept p and accept not-p, you violate these rules because you cannot
accept p and also reject p.
Now I am this character. I accept every proposition and therefore the
negation of every proposition. I am wildly out of accord with the constitutive
rules for negation. In giving the liar argument, I want to make you more like
me. I accept all of Aristotle’s propositions, but I also accept their negations. I
neither reject nor am neutral about anything. So I don’t want to make you reject
or be neutral about any proposition. I accept Non-contradiction, though I don’t
reject contradictions, I accept them. And, of course, though I accept Aristotle’s
view, I don’t accept it his way. He rejects the opposites of what he accepts. I
accept the opposites of what I accept. I accept Aristotle’s view, but I do not
adopt his stance, so to speak. And I want to make you more like me.
So I accept and expect you to accept Excluded Middle. I accept and
expect you to accept the Correspondence Theory. I derive the contradiction. I
accept and hope to force you to accept it as well. But I do not therefore hope
that you will give up accepting Non-contradiction. I accept it, and will be happy
if you do too.
Now this argument is clearly not a reductio; it is, like my first
reconstruction, a direct derivation of a contradiction. However here there is no
effort to go on and force rejection of Non-contradiction. So the question arises:
if this argument is not a reductio, is it at least a refutation? Well, in a sense
no. I accept everything and am not trying to get you to reject anything or even
to give up accepting anything. But in other ways, it is a refutation. I am trying to
get you to give up your stance if not your view. And I am trying to get you to
accept negations of things you initially accept.

I am now going to give two skeptical reconstructions. And then there
will turn out to be a third. One will involve an ad hominem deployment of the liar
argument and the other will construct an explicitly skeptical argument to a
skeptical conclusion. And the third we’ll get to later. By an ad hominem
argument I mean of course, not the more familiar kind of fallacy - or supposed
fallacy - but an argument which is presented not as acceptable to the presenter
but with the idea that the hearer ought to find it compelling.
For this reconstruction, I suppose that in my official philosophical view, I
have no opinions. I neither accept nor reject anything. In a sense then I cannot
give an argument, in my own voice, so to speak. I accept no premises and am
unwilling to accept any conclusions. Or, the other way, I reject no conclusions
and am unwilling to reject any premises. But I can propose an argument in an
ad hominem way, hoping that it will be effective for you. So I propose excluded
middle, expecting you to initially accept it, and I propose the correspondence
theory in the same way. I propose therefore the contradiction, expecting you to
both feel compelled to accept it and compelled to reject it.
Now you may react to my argument in various ways. You may take it as
a direct proof and accept the contradiction. You may take it as a reductio and
reject a premise. But, of course, these reactions are not what I’m hoping for,
since I neither accept nor reject anything. I am neutral about everything and
want you to be more like me. My intention is that you will be so appalled at all
the possible acceptings and rejectings that you will recoil from them all and
refuse to accept or reject any of the propositions involved in the argument.
Therefore, you will be more like me.
So the argument as I intend it isn’t either a direct proof or reductio. It is
something else, which we may label a “stunning” argument, since its purpose is
to stun the hearer or paralyze him, so to speak, into a lack of belief. If we ask:
is it a refutation?, the answer will be, No and Yes. It doesn’t conclude to a
rejection of a proposition or to the accepting of a negation. It does however
aim to lead to your giving up you initial beliefs in favor of neutrality.
My fifth reconstruction involves a different sort of skeptic. In this
version, I have beliefs and believe and disbelieve many things. And perhaps
when I believe something, I believe it is true and not false. But one of my
beliefs is that there is no knowledge. So I never believe that any of my beliefs
are knowledge. As far as Aristotle’s three propositions are concerned, it turns
out not to matter to this reconstruction whether I believe them, disbelieve them,
or am neutral. Let’s suppose I am neutral.
This reconstruction is suggested by Schwed’s remarks about Cicero.
Like Cicero, I believe that the senses are not a source of knowledge and I wish
to argue that reason isn’t either. Now since I have beliefs, I can give arguments
in my own voice and not just ad hominem. However, I don’t believe that any
argument proves anything or disproves anything, since the idea of proof and
disproof involve the idea of knowledge. But I do think that some arguments are

convincing. I, or someone else, may believe the premises and be convinced
to believe the conclusion.
Now, I am going to give my argument. I give it as one I believe in and
hope you too will be convinced by. My argument isn’t the Liar itself but a
skeptical argument about the Liar and about reason. Here goes:
Reason accepts excluded middle. Reason accepts the correspondence
theory. So reason feels compelled to accept the contradiction. But reason
doesn’t want to accept the contradiction. So reason is wrong somewhere.
Now it doesn’t matter where reason is wrong. Maybe it is wrong about the
three Aristotle propositions. Maybe it is right about all of them but is wrong in
being taken in by the Liar argument. It doesn’t matter. It is wrong somewhere.
And, as Descartes will say in his day, a source of knowledge which is
sometimes wrong is never completely reliable, and is not a real source of
knowledge. But we could only claim to know any of Aristotle’s three principles
on the basis of reason. Therefore we do not know any of these principles.
So in this fifth reconstruction, I do not actually attack Aristotle’s truth
theory itself but only the further claim that that theory is known. So the question
whether there is a refutation or reductio of that theory is moot. Well at this
point, having given my five reconstructions, I intended to say that Schwed’s
statement that the Liar is a reductio is an unclear statement about a
complicated situation and to go on to another topic. But as I get here, I have
some second thoughts.
My reconstructions are not very attentive to the actual history. Maybe a
reconstruction based more on Schwed’s more attentive interpretation would be
better. And in some of my versions, an argument which is in one way not a
refutation is in another way a refutation after all. Maybe this happens also with
reductio. Perhaps I can find some way clear to even myself in which Schwed
is right in calling the Liar a reductio.
Looking over Schwed’s interpretation of the positive content of the
skeptic’s view with my own five reconstructions in mind, I see that I can get
pretty close to Schwed’s interpretation by combining aspects of my fifth and
fourth reconstructions. From the fifth, I adopt the idea that I as a skeptic may
nonetheless have all kinds of beliefs. From the fourth, I borrow the idea of
applying the liar in an ad hominem and stunning manner. Then I will also
examine the stunning version of the liar more closely to find after all a sort of
reductio aspect to it.
I am a skeptic. I believe things, I believe all three of Aristotle’s
propositions about truth - except when I look at the liar: Then I am stunned into
neutrality about them. The only thing I disagree with Aristotle about is that I
believe we don’t know Aristotle’s three principles. I believe usually all of
Aristotle’s propositions and usually I have Aristotle’s whole stance. I believe
the propositions, I reject their opposites. I reject contradictions.

I never reject Aristotle’s view. Usually I accept it. When stunned, I am
neutral.
Now Schwed is right in reporting that some of my more cockamamie
skeptical colleagues reject Aristotle’s theory and have an alternative theory of
truth. But I find their thinking incoherent and some aspects of it tend to stun me,
like the liar does. I shall report on their views a bit later, but I cannot follow them
in their beliefs. Now, as I say, I do not believe I know Aristotle’s propositions. If
I have beliefs different from Aristotle’s. they are not beliefs about the nature or
existence of truth but only about the knowability of truth and about in what sense
we can have justified true belief. We cannot have justified true beliefs in the
sense of knowledge, but I think I have beliefs which are true and satisfy me in
their coherence and agreeableness. That is the only kind of justification we
mortals can have, I think.
The reason I don’t think we know Aristotle’s three principles is because
of the liar. Plato says in the Meno (98a) that true belief is not knowledge unless
it is so well grounded and stabilized that it cannot be upset by objections. But
my beliefs in Aristotle are upset every time I contemplate the liar argument. So
those beliefs aren’t knowledge. That is my whole view.
Let me now describe some of my more cockamamie colleagues. They
start like me. They argue that we don’t know the truth of Aristotle’s view. Thus
they feel free to reject Aristotle’s view and to concoct some or other
cockamamie alternative view, more or less arbitrarily. I see no real reason for
any particular alternative view.
Still the most popular alternative seems to arise from the desire not, in
a sense, to be skeptics, after all. My colleagues reason, incoherently it seems
to me, that if it is impossible to know any Aristotelean truth, perhaps it is
possible to know some other kind of truth. Perhaps I can’t know that P is true,
but I can know that P is true for me. Thus if truth-for-me is the only kind of truth
there is, I can know the only kind of truth there is and thus escape skepticism,
in a sense. Now this view seems incoherent to me. If I know that P is true for
me, it seems to follow that I know that it is true that (P is true for me), and this
last truth seems after all to be an Aristotelean kind of truth! So to me their view
is incoherent. Of course, I don’t know it’s incoherent. But I think it’s
incoherent. Or is it that I think I think its incoherent? Or is it that....? Well, here
I feel I am about to be stunned. So let’s talk about something else!
(Parenthetical Note: I am pretending to be a certain skeptic. This
skeptic shies away from his “cockamamie colleagues” view. But what he is
really shying away from is the suggestion that I know what I think. He is trying
not to think about a Cartesian style refutation of his own skepticism, according
to which I can think that P without knowing that P but I cannot think that P
without knowing that I think P. I now return you to the skeptic.)
Well, now I have expounded my view and it is time to analyze the

stunning impact of the liar upon me and to look for its reductio aspect.
Paradoxically, the stunning impact of the liar on my Aristotelean and logical
views depends on the fact that though I give up all those views, I retain
throughout the argument some aspects of my stance. I have to in a sense
react to the liar argument as valid for me. That is, I have to find for instance,
that I cannot accept the premises without accepting the conclusion. Otherwise
I would accept the Aristotelean premises and have no problem.
Also, I find that I cannot reject the conclusion without rejecting or at least
neutralizing the conjunction of the premises. Otherwise, I could reject the
contradictory conclusion and have no problem. Also, though I can under
pressure bring myself to suspend belief in the premises of the argument, I
cannot bring myself to reject those premises. Otherwise I would be subject to a
full fledged reductio in which I reject the conclusion and thus reject the
premises. Also, though I can under press suspend disbelief of the conclusion, I
cannot bring myself to accept the conclusion. Otherwise I would be subject to
an out and out direct derivation in which I accepted the premises and therefore
accepted the contradictory conclusion.
From these facts there arises a halfway, though not a full-fledged, direct
derivation aspect to the argument. I cannot bring myself to reject the premises
so therefore I cannot reject the conclusion, lest I be subjected to full-fledged
reductio of the premises. This is a direct derivation aspect in the following
way. A full direct derivation would be to accept the premises and therefore
accept the conclusion. The halfway direct derivation is to be unable to reject
the premises and therefore to be unable to reject the conclusion.
The reductio aspect, again in a halfway sense, is the converse of this.
Since I cannot accept the conclusion, therefore I cannot accept the conjunction
of the premises. So putting both aspects together, I have to be neutral about
both the conclusion and at least the conjunction of the premises. I could
continue to accept one of the two premises and be neutral only about the other,
but presumably see no way to choose and am neutral about both. As for Noncontradiction, my neutrality about the contradictory conclusion forces me to be
neutral about Non-contradiction, since acceptance of Non-contradiction would
force rejection of that contradiction. And that concludes my reconstruction.
But while I am having second thoughts, let me reconsider also my
reconstruction three, the vegetable reconstruction where I could find no
reductio. My inability to find a reductio there, where we ended up accepting all
relevant propositions, rested on the thought that a reductio involves adopting
some negative attitude, if not rejection than at least refusal to accept, towards
a conclusion and therefore adopting a negative attitude also to the premises.
But there is clearly no reductio of that sort in reconstruction three where the
conclusion and the premises are all accepted.
However, I feel that Schwed will find my argument confusing and
unconvincing. He will say, “Look, Powers himself admits that in reconstruction

three there is in a sense a refutation. The original stance, if not the view, is
given up. And the argument which forces that change uses only premises from
and aspects of that stance itself and does not employ outside considerations.
But surely, in the broadest sense of reductio, a reductio is just the refutation of
something, even if it is a stance rather than a view, as Powers says, using only
materials from that something, or stance itself. Therefore there is reductio
after all in that broadest sense. And in all Powers’ reconstructions, the liar is a
reductio in this sense.” And if Schwed objects in this way, which I feel sure he
will, I agree with him.
My point all along has been that we are considering logically
pathological views and when we consider such bizarre views, our ordinary
concepts of ‘reductio’ and ‘refutation’ develop some surprising ambiguities
and become problematic. But in the end Schwed is right in feeling that the Liar
is in some sense clearly a reductio. I now turn briefly to a different topic. At the
beginning of his paper, Schwed says that ‘the liar is not an anomaly in need of
a solution but rather a part of a refutation move’ or ‘an undesirable
consequence of ....realism.’
I have, to an extent, already agreed with Schwed here. I have agreed at
least that the Liar is an attempted refutation of what Schwed calls realism and
that at that time it was a live argument about live issues. And I can agree that
today, when it has been reduced to a leftover problem, about settled issues
there is at least the possibility of observing that if the leftover problem does not
actually get solved, perhaps the settled issues are not really settled.
Still what Schwed says, taken literally, does not seem to be true. Does
he mean that the liar is a refutation of realism and therefore not an anomaly to
be solved? But, I for one am not willing to give up realism. Shall I give up Noncontradiction? Excluded Middle? The Correspondence Theory? Not likely! I
have to regard the liar as an anomaly to be solved, precisely because it
appears to be a refutation of these propositions. Nor can I really accept
Schwed’s argument that because the argument is really a metaphysical and
epistemological argument, therefore it is not a ‘semantic paradox’ and is not
‘a sophism’.
Surely I as a realist must regard the argument as an argument that only
appears to refute my view, therefore as a sophism, however deep. And I must
regard it as an argument that appears to prove an impossibility, and so a
paradox. And I must regard it as some sort of logical and semantic anomaly
and this in two ways. First because by my metaphilosophical lights, any
philosophical argument which appears to prove something false must be
regarded somehow as involving misunderstandings of relevant meanings and
logic, and so a semantic and logical misunderstanding.
Second, because the liar argument attacks realism, which consists of
two logical principles and a semantic principle, so the liar argument is logical
and semantic in its own content. True, while acceptance of logical principles

tells us little of metaphysical interest, the rejection of basic logical principles
would be metaphysically and in every other way momentous, if only because
contradictions imply everything. So I as a realist have to regard the liar as a
semantically and logical anomaly to be solved.

